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Forty Years Later: Chronicling the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and its Impact on Louisiana's Judiciary
Jonathan C. Augustine*
Hon. Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux"
It is something to be able to paint a particular picture, or to
carve a statue, and so to make afew objects beautiful; but it is
far more glorious to carve and paint the very atmosphere and
medium through which we look... [t]o affect the quality of the
day, that is the highest of the arts. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
March 7, 1965 was an infamous day in United States history.2 The
Civil Rights Movement was well under way. Activists attempted to draw
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Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and argued many of the cases
discussed herein. The authors hope this work is a fitting tribute to celebrate the
fortieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act and its impact on Louisiana's
African-American judiciary through the courtroom victories so much hard work
made possible.
1. Henry David Thoreau, Walden 61 (Owen Thomas ed., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1966) (1854).
2. In what would become known as "Bloody Sunday," civil rights activists
Hosea Williams and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Chairman,
John Lewis led a group of about 525 silent marchers across the Edmund Pettus
Bridge in Selma, Alabama where they were attacked by police. The subsequent
beatings, widely publicized across the United States, greately helped strengthen
the activists' position in support of a federal law to protect minority citizens'
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attention to the political disparities and inequalities blacks were forced
to endure because African-Americans were so frequently denied the
right to vote.3 Shortly after Bloody Sunday, Congress acted pursuant to
its constitutional authority4 and passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'
Although Congress passed the Act in 1965, its real significance
in Louisiana's judiciary arguably was not realized for more than
twenty years.6 Moreover, this realization of African-Americans'
power to elect judicial representatives of their own choosing did
not come through Congress-it came through litigious victories in
the courts.7  This article commemorates the Act's fortieth
anniversary and celebrates its impact on Louisiana's judiciary. In
addition to providing a chronicle of courtroom victories it enabled,
this article appropriately highlights Louisiana Supreme Court
constitutional right to vote. Two days later, Dr. Martin Luther King and Rev.
Ralph David Abernathy organized a new march during which the marchers knelt
and prayed on the site of "Bloody Sunday."
3. African-Americans were originally granted the right to vote during
Reconstruction, with Amendment XV to the United States Constitution ("the
Fifteenth Amendment"). In relevant part, the Fifteenth Amendment provides
"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 (1870) (emphasis
added).
4. The Fifteenth Amendment expressly provides "[t]he Congress shall
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. at § 2.
5. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1973-1973gg-10 (2000)) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Act").
6. As noted in Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp 285 (M.D. La. 1988), as of
1988, "no black attorney ha[d] been elected to the Louisiana Supreme Court. A
black attorney, Jessie Stone, was appointed to a vacancy on the Louisiana
Supreme Court for a period of seventeen days, from November 2, 1979 through
November 19, 1979." Id. at 290. Furthermore, outside of Orleans Parish and as
recent as 1988, there were only four black attorneys elected to district court
judgeships in Louisiana: (1) Paul Lynch, elected in District 1 in 1978; (2) Lionel
Collins, elected in District 24 in 1978; (3) Carl Stewart, elected in District 1 in
1985; and (4) Freddie Pitcher, Jr., elected in District 19 in 1986. Id. at 291.
7. See generally Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991)
(enjoining the state of Louisiana from conducting judicial elections without the
requisite preclearance from the United States Department of Justice, as
necessitated by the Act); see also Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.
1988) (the Chisom and Clark cases are arguably the reason so many black
jurists have been elected in the Louisiana judiciary).
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Associate Justice Bernette Joshua Johnson. 8 Justice Johnson is a
proud beneficiary of the Act who labored in the courts after its
initial enactment and worked with some of the pioneers in
Louisiana's black legal community.9 This article's publication is
also in celebration of Justice Johnson's eleventh anniversary as a
member of the Louisiana Supreme Court and the thirteenth
anniversary celebration of the election of Justice Revius 0.
Ortique, Jr., the first black justice elected to serve on Louisiana's
highest tribunal.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
A. The Need for Congress to Pass the Act
8. After earning her law degree in 1969 and becoming one of the first two
African-American women to graduate from Louisiana State University Law
School (her classmate was Gammiel Gray Poindexter, now a trial judge in
Virginia), then-Bernette Joshua worked with famed civil rights attorneys A.P.
Tureaud and Ernest N. "Dutch" Morial. Tureaud, affectionately known as
"Dean of Negro Lawyers," was a cooperating attorney with the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He also frequently worked
with then-lawyer Thurgood Marshall, who became the United States Supreme
Court's first African-American associate justice. See Lisa Aldred, Thurgood
Marshall: Supreme Court Justice 72 (1990). As of the date of this article's
publication, Bernette Joshua Johnson is the only African-American justice on
the Louisiana Supreme Court. She was initially elected to the Court in 1994 to
fill the unexpired term of the Hon. Revious 0. Ortique, Jr. in the so-called
"Chisom seat," discussed infra. In 2000, Justice Johnson was elected to a 10-
year term to represent the Court's reconfigured 7th Judicial District. See The
Louisiana Supreme Court Justices: Justice Bernette Joshua Johnson,
http://www.lasc.org/justices/johnson.asp.
9. Very early in her career, Justice Johnson worked for Dutch Morial, A.P.
Tureaud's prot6g6. Morial was the first black to graduate from Louisiana State
University Law School in 1954. See, e.g., Clark, 725 F. Supp. at 292 (citing
Morial as the first black graduate of Louisiana State University's law school
after a three-judge panel in Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), summarily aft'd, 340 U.S. 909, 71
S. Ct. 294 (1951), ordered the school to stop refusing to admit black students on
the basis of race). Morial went on to become the first black to serve in
numerous legal and political roles in Louisiana. Among them, he was the first
black: Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Louisiana; judge of the
Orleans Parish Juvenile Court; judge of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals; and mayor of New Orleans. See Herman Mason, Jr., The Talented
Tenth: the Founders and Presidents of Alpha 335-38 (2d. ed. 1999); see also
Louisiana District Judges Association, Biographies of Louisiana Judges (1971).
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Although the Civil Right Amendments' ° ended involuntary
servitude, granted blacks full citizenship, and theoretically granted
the right to vote, the Amendments' practical effect was far less
functional."1 "Louisiana [for example] has a long history of de
jure and de facto restrictions on the right of black citizens to
register, to vote, and to otherwise participate in the democratic
process."' 12 The Act, therefore, "set its sights on the most visible
barriers to black legal equality. These barriers were defined
primarily as direct, formal discriminatory practices intended to
exclude black participation in the central political and economic
institutions of American life."' 3
From its inception, the United States has had a bitterly long
history of racial divisiveness. 14 Consequently, even though blacks
were "free" to vote after adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment
states continued to deny minority citizens this fundamental right.13
10. The United States Constitution's Reconstruction Amendments are often
referred to as The Civil Rights Amendments. See generally U.S. Const. amends.
XIII (1865), XIV (1868) and XV (1869) (collectively referred to as "The Civil
Rights Amendments") (hereinafter "the Amendments"); see also A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process
5-7 (Oxford Univ. Press. 1978). Noted legal scholars argue the central purpose
of the Amendments was to prohibit state-sponsored racial discrimination. See,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principals and Policies § 9.3.3.1
(1997).
11. See generally Richard C. Wade, Howard B. Wilder & Louise C. Wade,
A History of the United States, Ch. 38 "Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
Introduce Changes" (1966) (discussing the practicality of racial tension and
discrimination black Americans suffered before and during the 1960's Civil
Rights Movement).
12. Clark, 725 F. Supp. at 295; Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 339-40
(E.D. La. 1983) ("Louisiana's history of racial discrimination, both de jure and
de facto, continues to have an adverse effect on the ability of its black residents
to participate fully in the electoral process.").
13. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: the
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1833, 1838
(1992).
14. See, e.g., Susan M. Lesson & James C. Foster, Constitutional Law:
Cases in Context 59 (1992) ("Beginning with the administration of James
Madison, the policy of the United States government was to remove Indians
from lands that whites wished to occupy.").
15. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1381-82
(1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society."); see also Jonathan C. Augustine, Rethinking Shaw v.
Reno, the Supreme Court's Benign Race-Related Jurisprudence and Louisiana's
Recent Reapportionment: the Argument for Intermediate Scrutiny in Racial
456 [Vol. 66
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Moreover, as other commentators have noted in addressing the
necessity of federal legislation to protect minority citizens' right to
vote:
Litigation of voting rights claims on a case-by-case basis
under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964
attempted to remedy unconstitutional voting practices but
had only negligible success, result[ing] in only piecemeal
gains . . . and was thwarted by the development of new
voting practices abridging or denying the minority right to
vote.
It was therefore essential that Congress pass federal legislation
to prevent discrimination at the polling place.
17
In Lane v. Wilson,18 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter observed that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies
sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It
hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap
exercise of the franchise .... ."19 Despite the broad intentions of
the amendment, however, "white [s]outherners in charge of
registration and voting readily circumvented the Fifteenth
Amendment. They had an arsenal of discriminatory schemes."
20
Notwithstanding flagrant attempts to limit minority citizens'
power of the franchise,
[t]he Voting Rights Act is one of the most successful civil
rights statutes ever passed by Congress. The [A]ct
accomplished what the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and numerous federal statutes had failed to
accomplish-it provided minority voters an opportunity to
Gerrymandering According to the Voting Rights Act, 29 S.U. L. Rev. 151, 163
(2001-2002); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1987-1988).
16. Tricia Ann Martinez, Comment, When Appearance Matters:
Reapportionment Under the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno, 54 La. L. Rev.
1335, 1336 (1994).
17. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521-22,
109 S. Ct. 706, 736-37 (1989) (noting that Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the unique power to combat state existent problems
of race) (Scalia, J., concurring).
18. 307 U.S. 268, 59 S. Ct. 872 (1939).
19. Id. at 275, 59 S. Ct. at 876.
20. Edward S. Corwin & J.W. Peltason, Understanding the Constitution 152
(4th ed.) (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1967).
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participate in the electoral process and elect candidates of
their choice, generally free of discrimination. 2 1
Accordingly, Congress was uniquely situated to act pursuant to
its constitutional authority to enact legislation to protect minority
citizens in their attempts to fully participate in the political process
and elect representatives of their own choosing.
B. A Practical Analysis: What the Act Sought to Accomplish
The Act essentially shifted the responsibility for ensuring that
the right to vote was not abridfed from the courts to the United
States Department of Justice. Sections 2 and 5 of the Act
eliminated qualifications as prerequisites to voting.23
Section 2 was originally a restatement of the Fifteenth
Amendment and applies to all jurisdictions. It prohibits
any state or political subdivision from imposing a "voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice
or procedure ... in a manner which results in the denial or
abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or
color."2 4
Stated in summation,
[t]he Act was viewed by many southern African-Americans
and civil rights activists as the resurrection of the
[F]ifteenth [A]mendment, a provision rendered impotent
prior to the passage of the Act by discrimination. For more
than a half century, white-controlled governments in the
South had suppressed the minority right to vote through the
use of violence, intimidation, and devices such as literacy
tests, poll taxes15 and primaries restricted on the basis of
race and wealth.
21. National Conference of State Legislatures: Redistricting Law 2000,
Chpt. 4, "Racial and Ethnic Discrimination," 47 (1999) (hereinafter "NCSL").
22. See Augustine, supra note 15 at 164.
23. Martinez, supra note 16 at 1337.
24. NCSL, supra note 21, at 48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (a)).
25. April D. Dulaney, Comment, A Judicial Exception for Judicial
Elections: "A Burning Scar on the Flesh of the Voting Rights Act," 65 Tul. L.
Rev. 1223, 1223-24 (1991) (citing David Gelfand, Voting Rights and the
Democratic Process: Ongoing Struggles and Continuing Questions, 17 Urb. Law
333, 333-34 & n.3 (1985)).
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Furthermore, Section 5 of the Act also requires Department of
Justice approval before a "covered jurisdiction"26 can change
voting practices. "A jurisdiction covered by Section 5 is required
to preclear any changes in its electoral laws, practices or
procedures with either the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia., 27 Congress, therefore,
passed the Act to ensure states adhered to the Fifteenth
Amendment's mandates in attempting to "rid the country of
racial discrimination in voting."
29
1. Section 2 of the Original Act and its Subsequent
Amendments
Section 2 of the Act as originally passed in 196530 provided as
follows:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision to deny the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 1973b (f)(2) of this title.3'
In 1982, Congress amended the Act to infuse it with new life.32
More importantly, Congress specifically amended Section 2 in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.33
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) for the criteria defining a "covered
jurisdiction" under the Act.
27. NCSL, supra note 21, at 48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)); see also
Robert B. McDuff, Judicial Elections and the Voting Rights Act, 38 Loy. L.
Rev. 931, 974 (1993).
28. See Corwin & Peltason, supra note 20 at 151; see also Martinez, supra
note 16, at 1337.
29. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315, 86 S. Ct. 803, 811-12
(1966).
30. Since its initial enactment in 1965, the Act has been amended three
times: 1970, 1975 and 1982. See NCSL, supra note 21, at 48.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b).
32. See Dulaney, supra note 25, at 1225.
33. 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1519 (1980). "Congress seized the opportunity
to re-examine the entire Voting Rights Act. Several members of Congress
voiced displeasure regarding the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden." Dulaney, supra note 25, at 1225-26 (citations omitted).
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In Bolden, a group of black citizens alleged Mobile's practice
of electing commissioners at-large illegally diluted minority voting
strength, thus violating the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
and Section 2 of the Act.34 The Court's plurality opinion provided
that "racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of
a Fifteenth Amendment violation."35  Moreover, the Court
concluded the plaintiffs failed to prove a violation under Section 2
of the Act because Congress did not intend Section 2 to have any
different effect from that of the Fifteenth Amendment.
36
The Bolden Court reasoned that Section 2 only operated to
prohibit intentionally discriminatory acts by state officials.
Subsequent analysis has noted:
[T]he Court required proof of discriminatory intent for
claims brought under [S]ection 2 of the ... Act, as well as
those brought under the [F]ourteenth and [F]ifteenth
[A]mendments. Under this new, onerous burden of proof,
plaintiffs could no longer rely on proof of discriminatory
effect to raise an inference of intent; they now had to prove
discriminatory purpose by "direct, smoking gun
evidence." 37
Accordingly, under the Court's holding, "[a]bsent direct
evidence of invidious purpose, no multimember electoral systems
could be challenged under either the Constitution or the Voting
Rights Act.",
38
Congress amended Section 2 so proof of intent would not be
required to establish violation of the statute.39  In doing so,
"Congress adopted the 'results' test, whereby plaintiffs may
prevail under [S]ection 2 by demonstrating that, under the totality
of the circumstances, a challenged election law or procedure has
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of
race.,' 40 It is therefore clear that Congress "amended the Voting
34. 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490.
35. Id. at 62, 100 S. Ct. 1497.
36. See id. at 60-61, 100 S. Ct. 1495-96.
37. Dulaney, supra note 25, at 1226 (citations omitted).
38. Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 1845-46 (citations omitted).
39. See NCSL, supra note 21, at 48. Congressional response to Bolden was
swift. A House Judiciary Committee's report found the intent standard
inappropriate and indicated the proper judicial focus should be on election
outcomes, not discriminatory intent. See H.R. Rep. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29-31 (1981).
40. Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1059. Congress' final adoption of
the "results test" included recommendations from the Senate Judiciary
460 [Vol. 66
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Rights Act expressly to repudiate Bolden and to outlaw electoral
practices that 'result in' the denial of equal political opportunity to
minority groups.'
The Senate Judiciary Committee found the Bolden Court "had
broken with precedent and substantially increased the burden on
plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by requiring proof of
discriminatory intent.",42  As such, the committee's report
concluded "[t]his intent test places an unacceptably difficult
burden on plaintiffs. It divests the judicial injury [sic] from the
crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the
electoral process to a historical question of individual motives.
' 4 3
The committee's report also took from Zimmer v. McKeithen44 a
non-exhaustive list of factors for courts to consider as part of
Section 2's legislative history.45 The seven Zimmer factors were
Committee, encompassing relevant language from White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 93 S. Ct. 2332 (1973), a case involving multimember state legislative
districts in Texas. See NCSL, supra note 21, at 52.
41. Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 1846 (citations omitted).
42. NCSL, supra note 21, at 53.
43. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 16 (1982).
44. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), affd per curiam sub nom. East
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S. Ct. 1083 (1976).
45. The list of factors included the following:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting in the election of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to
which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practice or procedure that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is
a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process; (5) the extent to which
members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment
and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process; (6) whether political campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; and (7) the extent to
which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. 29 (1982); see also White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 765-70, 93 S. Ct. 2332, 2339-42 (1973).
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critically important in Clark v. Edwards46 because they set the
foundation for a significant numbers of black lawyers to be elected
to Louisiana's judiciary.
As a result of Congress' most recent amendment to the Act,
Section 2 now provides as follows:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or
in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
1973(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
process leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process. And to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered:
Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population.47
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Act's 1982 Amendments to
Section 2
In 1984, the first case challenging at-large judicial elections
under Section 2 of the Act was filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Southern Mississippi. 48 Between 1982
and 1986, several lower court decisions upheld the
constitutionality of the Act's 1982 amendments. 49 However, the
46. 725 F. Supp. 285, 295-302.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (b) (1982).
48. See McDuff supra note 27 at 937-38 (discussing Martin v. Allain, 658
F.Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss. 1987)).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Marengo County Commission, 731 F.2d 1546
(11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984);
Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Rybicki v. State Bd.
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Supreme Court first considered the Act's 1982 amendments in the
1986 case Thornburg v. Gingles.
5 0
In Gingles, the plaintiffs challenged North Carolina's 1982
redistricting plans for one multimember state senate district, one
multimember, one single-member state senate district, and five
multimember state house districts. 51 Pursuant to Section 5 of the
Act, the Department of Justice precleared the districts.52 The
plaintiffs, however, alleged the precleared districts impaired black
citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice, in violation
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the
Act.5
3
In writing for the Court Justice Brennan analyzed the
legislative history of Section 2. He also rejected the earlier test
of intent to discriminate and instead noted that in determining if a
Section 2 violation has occurred, the courts should evaluate
whether "as a result of the challenged practice or structure
plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the
political processes and to elect candidates of their choice. 55
Brennan further indicated that a court "must assess the impact of
the contested structure or practice on minority electoral
opportunities 'on the basis of objective factors.' ' 56
Furthermore, in addition to the "objective factor" analysis, the
Gingles Court developed a new three-part test that a minority
group must meet to establish a vote dilution claim under Section 2
of the Act. The test requires that a minority group prove: (1) it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district; (2) it is politically cohesive;
and (3) in the absence of special circumstances, block voting by
of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Rybicki 1); 574 F. Supp. 1147
(N.D. I11. 1983) (Rybicki If).
50. 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
51. See id. at 35, 106 S. Ct. 2758.
52. See id., 106 S. Ct. 2758.
53. Id., 106 S. Ct. 2758.
54. See id. at 42-52, 106 S. Ct. at 2761-67.
55. Id. at 44, 106 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (citing S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong. 2nd
Sess. at 28)
56. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2762-63; see also McDuff supra note 27, at 972 ("The
statement in Gingles regarding size and compactness of the minority population
illustrates one of the requirements in section 2 cases-plaintiffs must
demonstrate the potential of creating some other remedial electoral
configuration that will improve minority opportunities to elect candidates of
choice.").
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the white majority usually defeats the minority's preferred
candidate.
57
3. The Original Section 5 of the Act, its Preclearance
Requirement for Covered Jurisdictions, and its Subsequent
Amendments
When the Act was originally passed, "Section 5 was considered
one of the primary enforcement mechanisms to ensure that
minority voters would have an opportunity to register to vote and
fully participate in the electoral process free of discrimination."5
8
Moreover, "[t]he intent of Section 5 was to prevent states that had
a history of racially discriminatory electoral practices from
developing new and innovative means to continue to
disenfranchise [b]lack voters." 59
Prior to the Act's original passage in 1965, Congress had
already 6,passed several laws attempting to protect minority
citizens. Nevertheless, "despite the earnest efforts of the Justice
Department and of many federal judges. ., laws [did] little to cure
the problem of vot[er] discrimination." Prior to Congress'
passage of Section 5, "the federal government, through the Civil
Rights Division of the Department of Justice undertook the
arduous and time-consuming task of filing individual suits against
each discriminatory voting law. This approach proved
unsuccessful in increasing [b]lack voter registration. ' 62 Arguably,
the Act has proved so effective because of the requirements within
Section 5.
57. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S. Ct. at 2766-67 (citations
omitted).
58. NCSL supra note 21, at 80; see also McDuffsupra note 27, at 974.
59. Id.; McDuff supra note 27, at 974 ("In passing the 1965 Voting Rights
Act, Congress attempted, among other things, to prevent states and localities
with severe histories of electoral discrimination from devising new schemes to
frustrate the emergence of black political power.").
60. See Martinez, supra note 16, at 1336.
61. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,313, 86 S. Ct. 803, 810-11
(1966).
62. NCSL, supra note 21, at 80. Before passage of Section 5, only 29
percent of blacks were registered to vote in several southern states, including
Louisiana and Mississippi, compared with 73.4 percent of whites. By 1967,
only two years after Section 5 was adopted, more than 52 percent of blacks were
registered in those same states. See id. (citing B. Grofman, L. Handley, & R.
Neimi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality 23
(Cambridge University Press 1992)).
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Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions 63 to submit any
proposed changes in voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting to either
the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia for preclearance before the proposed change
can be implemented. 64 If a covered jurisdiction seeks preclearance
through the courts,65 the preclearance is considered "judicial."66
Conversely, if the jurisdiction seeks the preclearance through the
Department of Justice, the preclearance is considered
"administrative."
In 1970, Congress extended the preclearance requisite of
Section 5 for an additional five years. The Act's 1975 and 1982
amendments broadened the substantive scope of Section 5 even
further and also extended its operation until 2007. In 1975,
Congress extended the section's preclearance requirements for an
additional seven years, or through the 1980 redistricting cycle.
6 9
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (defining covered jurisdictions under the Act).
64. See NCSL, supra note 21, at 80 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). To obtain
judicial preclearance for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a
covered jurisdiction must file a petition for declaratory judgment with the
requisite burden of proving the proposed electoral change will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color or
membership in a language minority group. The Department of Justice serves as
the opposing party in litigation. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
65. See McDuff supra note 27, at 974-75; see also NCSL supra note 21, at
92-93 (describing the process of filing a petition for declaratory judgment
against the Department of Justice and the requisite burden of proof associated
therewith).
66. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S. Ct. 1357 (1976),
discussed infra.
67. The Department of Justice has issued guidelines regarding the
administrative preclearance process. The most recent guidelines were issued in
1988 and updated in 1998. See 28 CFR § 51. In light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471, 117 S. Ct. 1491
(1997), questioning the validity of the regulations, the Department of Justice
repealed the part of the Section 5 preclearance guidelines that required a plan to
also comply with Section 2 of the Act. See generally, 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.13-.27
(2005).
68. NCSL, supra note 21, at 80. Congress' 1970 amendments to the Act
also expanded coverage to those states and political subdivisions that used a
specified test or devise and where less than half the voting age population
actually voted in the November 1968 federal elections. As a result of Section
5's 1970 amendments, three counties in New York and parts of New Hampshire
became subject to Section 5's preclearance requirements. See id. at 81 n.350.
69. See id.
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Similarly, in 1982, Congress again extended the section's
preclearance requirements for an additional twenty-five years.
With regard to covered jurisdictions, therefore, the preclearance
requirements of Section 5 are almost absolute.
70
The 1975 amendments required the use of bilingual election
materials and assistance if five percent of the jurisdiction's voting
age citizens were of a single language minority and the literacy
rate of that language minority group was greater than the national
average.71  Furthermore, the 1975 amendments expanded the
coverage requirements of Section 5 to include jurisdictions that
maintained any test or device and had less than half of their voting
age population either registered on November 1, 1972 or voting in
the November 1972 federal election.72  Because the 1982
amendments only extended Section 5's preclearance requirement
an additional twenty-five years, they did not make any substantive
changes to the section.
4. Judicial Interpretation of Section 5
In Beer v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether changes in the apportionment of city council districts in
the city of New Orleans ("the City") violated the Act.73 The City
conducted its standard decennial reapportionment after it received
the figures from the 1970 Census. When the City attempted to
obtain administrative preclearance of its reapportionment from the
U.S. Department of Justice, however, the attorney general rejected
the City's plans as impermissibly diluting black voting strength by
combining a number of black voters with a larger number of white
voters.74 The City, therefore, filed a petition for declaratory
70. The Act's only exception to Section 5's requirements is the so-called
"bail out" provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (a)(1). Under it, an otherwise
covered jurisdiction may bail out from Section 5's preclearance requirements if
it can demonstrate that, during the proceeding ten year period, it complied with
the Act and undertook efforts to ensure minority participation in the electoral
process. See NCSL, supra note 21, at 94 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (a)(1)).
71. See NCSL, supra note 21, at 80 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (f)(4)).
72. See id. at 81. As a result of the Act's 1975 amendments, Alaska,
Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and parts of California, Florida, Michigan and
South Dakota were covered under the Act. Id. n.353; see also McDuff, supra
note 27, at 974.
73. 425 U.S. 130, 96 S. Ct. 1357 (1976).
74. See id. at 137, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1361-62. Even before the Department of
Justice rejected the City's Plan I, it began working on Plan II. Plan II was
nevertheless also rejected by the attorney general. See id. See 28 C.F.R. §
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judgment with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
pursuant to Section 5 of the Act.
The City sought judicial preclearance of its newly adopted city
council reapportionment plan. Similar to the Department of
Justice, however, the district court found the City's new
reapportionment plan would abridge the voting rights of the City's
black citizens and concluded that "Plan II would have the effect of
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 75
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the City's suit. 76
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.77 The
Court found the City's new reapportionment plan was valid where
it had the effect of enhancing the position of racial minorities. In
reversing, the Court noted "[t]he language of § 5 clearly provides
that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures.
'[D]iscriminatory practices... instituted prior to November 1964.
• .are not subject to the requirement of preclearance [under §
5].' 1978 Moreover, the Court wrote that "[a] new legislative
apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment
itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution.
79
In 1983, the Court broadened the Beer Court's retrogression
standard in City of Lockhart v. United States. ° In Lockhart, the
Court precleared an electoral change that did not improve the
position of minority voters. The Court noted, however, that
"[allthough there may have been no improvement in [minorit)}
voting strength, there has been no retrogression, either."
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that "[s]ince the new plan did not
increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, it was entitled
to Section 5 preclearance. 8 2
51.54(a) (2005) for the standard the Department of Justice employs in such
cases.
75. Id.
76. Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 402 (D.D.C. 1974) ("[T]he
feature of the city's electoral scheme by which two councilmen are selected at
large has the effect of impermissibly minimizing the vote of black citizens; and
the further conclusion that for this additional reason the city's redistricting plan
does not pass constitutional muster.") (citations omitted).
77. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 143, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1364 (1976).
78. Id. at 138, 96 S. Ct. 1362 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 141, 96 S. Ct. 1364.
80. 460 U.S. 125, 103 S. Ct. 998 (1983).
81. Id. at 135, 103 S. Ct. at 1004.
82. Id. at 134, 103 S. Ct. at 1004.
20061
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court's only black member,
dissented in Lockhart. Justice Marshall wrote that "[b]y holding
that § 5 forbids only electoral changes that increase discrimination
the Court reduces § 5 to a means of maintaining the status quo.''s3
Marshall therefore reasoned the Court's view would permit the
adoption of a discriminatory electoral scheme, provided the
scheme was no more discriminatory than its predecessor and was
consistent with both the language and intent of Section 5.84
In Young,85 the Supreme Court specifically addressed the
question of whether changes the state of Mississippi made to the
procedure by which its residents and citizens were allowed to
register to vote--changes made to be in compliance with the
National Voter Registration Act of 199386 -required preclearance
under Section 5.87- The Court began from the position that all
electoral changes, regardless of the reason therefore, must be
precleared by covered jurisdictions.88 Accordingly, the Court
expressly ruled that Mississippi's compliance with the NVRA was
subject to the requirements under Section 5.89
The NVRA requires states to provide simplified systems for
registering to vote in federal elections. In accordance with the
NVRA, states must provide a system for voter registration by
mail,90 at various state offices,91 and on a driver's license
application.92 In an effort to comply with the statute, the state of
83. Id. at 137, 103 S. Ct. at 1005 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. See id.
85. 520 U.S. 273, 117 S. Ct. 1228 (1997).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (200) (hereinafter "the NVRA").
87. Young, 520 U.S. at 275, 117 S. Ct. at 1231.
88. See id. (citing Allen v. State Bd. Of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-69, 89
S. Ct. 817, 832-34 (1969)); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 153, 101 S. Ct.
224, 238 (1981) (requiring preclearance for any changes in voter or voting
practices or procedures within covered jurisdictions); Lopez v. Montgomery
County, 519 U.S. 9, 22, 105 S. Ct. 1128, 133-35 (1996) (quoting McDaniel to
emphasize the necessity for covered jurisdictions to preclear any change in voter
or voting practices resulting from policy decisions); NAACP v. Hampton
County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 175-77 (1985); 28 C.F.R. § 51.12
(2005) (requiring preclearance of "[a]ny change affecting voting, even though it
appears to be minor or indirect...").
89. Young, 520U.S. at275,117 S. Ct. at 1231.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-4 (2000).
91. Id. § 1973gg-5.
92. Id. § 1973gg-3.
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Mississippi made certain changes in its registration procedures. 93
They were subsequently challenged by four private plaintiffs in the
United States district court and consolidated with a similar matter
filed by the United States. The three-judge district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rejected the
plaintiffs' argument. 94  The district court essentially rejected
plaintiffs' arguments by reasoning that because the changes at
issue were an attempt to correct a misapplication of state law, they
consequently did not require preclearance under Section 5 of the
Act.9
5
In discussing the critical nature of Section 5's preclearance
provision(s) in all instances when a covered jurisdiction makes any
changes to voter and voting practices or procedures, the Supreme
Court reversed the district court's ruling. In generally discussing
the absolute necessity of preclearance, the Court wrote that
[p]reclearance is, in effect, a determination that the change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color." In the language of § 5 jurisprudence, this
determination involves a determination that the change is
not retrogressive.9
6
Furthermore, in specifically examining the issue sub judice in
Young, the Court went on to hold the following:
The problem for Mississippi is that preclearance typically
requires examination of discretionary changes in context-
a context that includes history, purpose, and practical effect
.... The applicants and the [giovernment argue ...the
particular changes and the way Mississippi administers
them could ... abridge the right to vote. We cannot say
whether or not that is so, for that is an argument for the
merits. The question here is "preclearance," and
93. As previously indicated, all such changes within covered jurisdictions
must receive Section 5 preclearance. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 566-69, 89 S. Ct.
877, 832-34. It is important to note, therefore, that the NVRA specifically
provides that it does not supersede, restrict, or limit the Act's application and
does not "authoriz[e] or requir[e] conduct that is prohibited by the Voting Rights
Act of 1965." Young, 520 U.S. at 276, 117 S. Ct. at 1232 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1973gg-9(d)).
94. Id. at 280-81, 117 S. Ct. at 1234.
95. See id. at 281, 117 S. Ct. at 1234.
96. Id. at 276, 117 S. Ct. 1232 (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,
141, 96 S. Ct. 1357, 1363-64 (1976)).
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preclearance is necessary so that the appellants and the
[glovernment will have the opportunity to find out if it is
true.
97
The Court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment against the plaintiffs. It also remanded the litigation,
directing the state of Mississippi to preclear the changes it made to
be in compliance with the NVRA. 98
III. SECTIONS 2 AND 5 OF THE ACT AND LOUISIANA'S JUDICIARY:
CHISOM V. EDWARDS AND THE SUBSEQUENT LOUISIANA SUPREME
COURT SEAT
Prior to 1984, there is only one known case where plaintiffs
challenged a judicial election system as racially discriminatory.9 9
In Voter Information Project v. City of Baton Rouge, the plaintiffs
challenged the at-large judicial election method for the City Court
and 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton
Rouge.1° The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana originally dismissed the litigation, concluding if the one-
man, one-vote principle did not apply to judicial elections, the
Fourteenth Amendment's anti-vote dilution provisions did not
apply either.'
0
'
On appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The Fifth Circuit held that although the one-man, one-vote
principle was different from racial vote dilutions claims, any racial
discrimination in judicial elections was the proper subject of the
lawsuit.10 2 Specifically, the court noted "[i]t may well be true that
judges are elected to serve the people, not to represent them. But
this fact makes plaintiffs' clam of racial discrimination no less
important and no less deserving of constitutional protection.'
10 3
After the Fifth Circuit then remanded the litigation for a new trial,
the U.S. Supreme Court issued its previously discussed ruling in
97. Id. at 290-91, 117 S. Ct. at 1239 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 291, 117 S. Ct. at 1239.
99. See McDuff, supra note 27, at 936 (citing Voter Information Project,
Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1980)).
100. 612 F.2d 208, 209 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 210.
102. Id. at 212.
103. Id.
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Bolden.1°4 Accordingly, under Bolden's "discriminatory intent"
test, the plaintiffs dismissed their case.1
0 5
A. Historical Background and Rationale Supporting the Plaintiffs'
Claim
The case of Chisom v. Edwards10 6 began in 1987 when Ronald
Chisom, four other black plaintiffs, and the Louisiana Voter
Registration Education Crusade filed a complaint on behalf of the
class of all black persons registered to vote in Orleans Parish.
10 7
The plaintiffs alleged that the at-large method of electing justices
108 .from their Supreme Court judicial district impermissibly diluted
minority voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Act, as
amended in 1982,u9 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution." l0 Consequently,
the Chisom plaintiffs brought suit against the governor and other
state officials seeking a remedy that would have divided the First
Supreme Court District into two districts: one for Orleans Parish
and the second for the other three parishes. 
1
104. 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
105. See McDuff, supra note 27, at 936.
106. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v.
Chisom, 488 U.S. 955, 109 S. Ct. 390 (1988).
107. See id.
108. Louisiana's First Supreme Court Judicial District was comprised of
Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes. The district's voters
elected two justices from the district.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
110. See Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1057. The Supreme Court considered vote
dilution claims for the first time in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S. Ct.
498 (1965). In dicta, the Court wrote,
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multimember
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. When
this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider whether the
system still passes constitutional muster.
Id. at 439; see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751, 93 S. Ct. 2321,
2331 (1973).
111. "The concept of vote dilution involves two contributing factors which
act in tandem to produce a discriminatory result at the polls: (1) the existence of
racially-polarized bloc voting within certain voting populations; and (2)
districting schemes which, in combination with this bloc voting, operate in a
manner that minimizes or cancels out minority voting strength." Mark W.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court First Judicial District's
population was approximately thirty-four percent black and sixty-
three percent white."12 Moreover, the registered voter population
showed a similar percentage breakdown, with approximately
thirty-two percent black and sixty-eight percent white.' 13  The
statistics showed that "[o]ver half of the four parish First Supreme
Court District population and over half of the district's registered
voters live[d] in Orleans Parish. Importantly, Orleans Parish ha[d]
a fifty-five percent black population and a fifty-two percent black
registered voter population." 4  The Chisom plaintiffs sought a
division whereby one proposed judicial district would be
comprised of Orleans Parish, with a greater black population, and a
second judicial district would be comprised of Jefferson,
Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes." 
5
Initially, the district court in Chisom dismissed the plaintiffs'
Section 2 claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. 16 The court reasoned that Section 2 did not apply to
the election of state court judges."17 On appeal, however, the Fifth
Circuit focused on whether state judges and justices are
"representatives" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act.' 8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. Section 14(c)(1) of the
Act defines "voting" and "vote" for the Act's purpose.
Specifically, it sets forth the types of election practices
encompassed within the Act's regulatory scope." 9 In light of this
Mohoney, Comment, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Is it Applicable to State
Judicial Elections?, 29 Duq. L. Rev. 745, 746-47 (1991).
112. Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1057.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1058.
116. 659 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. La. 1987).
117. The district court concluded that because judges were not
"representatives," judicial elections were not covered by Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. See Chisom, 659 F. Supp. at 187.
118. The U.S. Supreme Court has indirectly, at least, regarded elected judges
as representatives by noting that "persons holding state elective or important
nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions . . .perform functions
that go to the heart of representative government." Sugerman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 647, 93 S. Ct. 2842, 2850 (1973).
119. Section 14(c)(1) provides the following:
The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action necessary to make
a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, included
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section, the Fifth Circuit in Chisom held that "judges are
'candidates for public or party office' elected in a primary, special,
or general election; therefore, Section 2, by its express terms,
extends to state judicial elections. This truly is the only
construction consistent with the plain language of the Act."'
120
The Chisom court viewed and interpreted the Act's legislative
history with an eye toward determining whether Congress intended
to exclude judicial elections from the Act's purview. 121 As such,
the judges arguably focused on the fact that
[t]he legislative history of the 1982 amendment reveals two
instances from which it can be inferred that the
congressional understanding was that the amendment
applied to judicial elections. First, Senator Orrin Hatch, in
comments contained in the Senate Report, stated that "the
term 'political subdivision' covered all governmental units,
including city and county councils, school boards, judicial
districts, as well as state legislatures." Second, the House
and Senate hearings on various versions of the Act were
replete with references to the election of judicial officials
under the Act. These references were to election results,
which included judicial elections that either demonstrated
an advance or loss of minority candidate success under
prior versions of the Voting Rights Act. Finally,
throughout the Senate Report, Congress used the word
"representative" interchangeably with "officials" and
"candidates" when discussing the meaning of [S]ection 2;
this the court thought further suggested that the
congressional intent was not to give the word
"representative" a specially technical legal meaning.122
but not limited to registration, pursuant to this subchapter or other
action required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and
having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate
totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public office and
propositions for which votes are received in an election.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(1) (2000).
120. Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1060. The Fifth Circuit subsequently overruled
itself on the issue of judicial elections being covered under Section 2 of the Act
in League of United Latin American Citizens Council v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620,
631 (5th Cir. 1990) (on rehearing en banc) (Clements I1).
121. See Mohoney, supra note 111, at 761.
122. Id. at 761-62 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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The Chisom court, therefore, placedjudicial elections squarely
within the scope of the Act's Section 2.12"3
B. Section 2 of the Act and Judicial Elections: A Word on
Clements and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of
Texas1
24
Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Chisom, the
Fifth Circuit later reversed its holding that Section 2 of the Act
applies to judicial elections in Clements 11.125 In examining the
Act's interpretative jurisprudence, it is imperative to discuss
Clements 126 and H and Clements II's subsequent reversal in
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas.127
In Clements I, the plaintiffs filed suit against the Texas attorney
general, secretary of state, and other state officials. They alleged
the county election of trial judges, with at-large elections on a
county basis, diluted minority voting strength in nine targeted
counties from which 172 of the 390 district judges were elected.1 2 8
In challenging specific Texas law, the plaintiffs filed a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and sought an injunction against further
elections and the subdistricting of the nine targeted county
districts.
129
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional claims
for failure to establish purposeful discrimination; however, under a
totality of the circumstances standard, the court concluded "that
each targeted district violated [S]ection 2 under the amended
'results test' and its accompanying standard of proof.' 130
On appeal, the state defendants argued judicial elections were
beyond the scope of Section 2 of the Act. Alternatively, they
argued that even if the court found judicial elections within the
scope of Section 2, vote dilution claims cannot be upheld where
the elected official singly performs all functions of the office. 13 1 In
rejecting these contentions and affirming Chisom, the Clements I
court wrote as follows:
123. See Chisom, 839 F.2d at 1060.
124. 501 U.S. 419, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991) (hereinafter "HLA").
125. 914 F.2d 620.
126. 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990).
127. 501 U.S. 419, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
128. 902 F.2d at 294, 93 S. Ct. at 2850.
129. Id. at 294-95, 93 S. Ct. at 2850.
130. Mohoney, supra note 111, at 763-64 (citing Clements 1, 902 F.2d at
295).
131. See generally Clements 1, 902 F.2d at 295-303.
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After careful consideration we conclude that Chisom was
correctly decided, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
applies to judicial elections. There cannot be a violation of
Section 2(b), however, through at-large elections of the trial
judges who sit on the Texas district courts. While elected
judges are representatives, in that they are accountable to a
constituency of electors, the full authority of a trial judge's
office is exercised exclusively by one individual, and there
can be no share of such a single-member office.
Consequently, the county-wide election of district court
judges does not violate the Voting Rights Act. 132
On rehearing in Clements II, however, the court determined
that state judicial office was beyond the purview of subsection (b)
of Section 2. Consequently, the court decided it did not need to
address the single-member office exception that served as the basis
for its previous holding. 133  As one author noted in describing
Clements II, "[t]he majority ... held that [S]ection 2 of the Voting
Rights Act applied only to 'representatives,' and that judges are
not representatives because they do not represent the people, but
serve them by making decisions based on principles higher than
the popular will.' 134 As such, the Fifth Circuit did an about face
and departed from its previous holdings. 135  The Clements 11
majority expressly "exempted judicial elections from the coverage
of [S]ection 2 because it found that judges do not fall within the
meaning of the term 'representative,' which was included in the
amended language of the section.''1 3
6
132. Id. at 308.
133. See Clements II, 914 F.2d at 624; see also Mohoney, supra note 111, at
764.
134. Edward Still, Voluntary Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a
Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, 9 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
354, 356 (1991) (citations omitted); see also McDuff supra note 27, at 940.
135. See Clements H, 914 F.2d at 622-25.
136. Dulaney, supra note 25, at 1229 (citations omitted).
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In HLA, 137 the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
Clements H ruling on the issue of judicial elections being exempt
from Section 2 of the Act.13' The Court remanded the litigation to
the Fifth Circuit where a panel of the court found in favor of the
plaintiffs in Clements 111.139 The plaintiffs, however, were
ultimately unsuccessful because of the Supreme Court's dictum in
HLA. In relevant part, the Court wrote:
[W]e believe that the State's interest in maintaining the
electoral system-in this case Texas' interest in
maintaining a link between a district judge's jurisdiction
and the area of residency of his or her voters-is a
legitimate factor to be considered by courts among the
"totality of the circumstances" in determining whether a § 2
violation has occurred. A State's jurisdiction for its
electoral system is a proper factor for the courts to assess in
a racial vote dilution inquiry .... 140
As such, the Clements plaintiffs failed because after remand
from the Supreme Court and another finding for the plaintiffs at
the district court, an en banc Fifth Circuit again concluded "the
State of Texas had an overriding interest in maintaining the
impartiality of the bench, that the county-wide election system
promotes that interest and that the district judge's findinms were
not supportive of a violation of the Voting Rights Act." 1 The
137. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419,
111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). In Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 111 S. Ct. 2354
(1991), the Supreme Court also rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning of
excluding the elected judiciary from the Act. Instead, the Court noted that a
better reading of the word "representative" describes the winners of popular
elections. Accordingly, the Court reasoned if executive officers, like
prosecutors, sheriffs, state attorneys general, and state treasurers are considered
representatives because they won a popular election, the same reasoning should
then apply to members of the judiciary. See id.; see also Still, supra note 134, at
356-57.
138. See 501 U.S. at 428, 111 S. Ct. 2381; see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging
the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial
Courts, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 95, 107-08 (1997).
139. 986 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993).
140. Houston Lawyers'Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 426-27, 111 S. Ct. at 2381.
141. Ifill, supra note 138, at 109; see also McDuff, supra note 27, at 954-68
(providing a detailed discussion of "state interests" in judicial election voting
rights litigation).
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Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. 14 2 Relative to this
article, however, the critical fact drawn from HLA and Chisom v.
Roemer is that judicial elections clearly fall within the Act's
scope. 143
IV. THE CHISOM AND CLARK CASES SET THE FOUNDATION FOR A
SIGNIFICANT AFRICAN-AMERICAN PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA'S
JUDICIARY
A. Understanding Clark v. Edwards and What the Litigation did to
Increase the Amount of African-American Jurists in Louisiana
1. Phase 1: Acknowledging the Problem
In Clark v. Edwards,144 a group of black lawyers, all
possessing the statutory qualifications for election to Louisiana
district court, family court, and court of appeals office, alleged
Louisiana's system of multimember judicial elections diluted black
voting strength in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. 145 The plaintiffs sued Louisiana state officials,
including the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general-
all in their official capacities-as well as various other election
officials. 46
After trial on the merits, the district court issued a preliminary
injunction, enjoining the respective state officials from holding
certain judicial elections that were originally scheduled for October
1988.14 In its subsequently promulgated opinion, the court
permanently enjoined the elections at issue because it found
systematic violations of Section 2 of the Act.
148
The court specifically observed the Fifth Circuit's then-recent
ruling in Chisom v. Edwards,149 for the position that judicial
142. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 510
U.S. 1071, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
143. See, e.g., La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 99-30 (May 18, 1999), available at
1999 WL 372514 (explaining generally the jurisprudential authority governing
judicial elections under the Voting Rights Act in Louisiana).
144. 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988).
145. Id. at 287.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 303.
149. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988).
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elections fall squarely within the scope of Section 2 of the Act.150
However, the court specifically rejected the notion that judicial
elections are subject to the "one man-one vote" concept by writing
as follows:
Judicial districts are created, not by reason of population,
but for the purpose of the administration of justice in a
particular jurisdiction. Judgeships are added, not because
of population, but because of caseload. The boundaries of
district courts are jurisdictional, not related to population.
Judges are charged, not with making legislative or social
policy, but with the duty of deciding individual cases
according to law, even when it is unpopular to do so.
Hence, it has been recognized that the "one man-one
vote" principle of legislative apportionment does not apply
to judicial elections. I
Nevertheless, in applying the seven analytical factors
promulgated by the Senate Judiciary Committee while amending
the Act in 1982, the court found significant systemic evidence of
violations of Section 2 of the Act.1 52  Of particular note, in
evaluating racially polarized voting-the second of the seven
factors-the court noted "[t]he existence of racially polarized
voting in Louisiana has been found by many courts."1 This is
particularly significant because in discussing one of the expert
witness' determinations, the court stated:
[I]n 28 of the 32 elections for district court and court of
appeal, including Orleans, black voters expressed a
preference for black candidates (27 by majority, one by
plurality), while white voters never cast a majority or even
a plurality for any black candidate. In the other 20 judicial
elections which were analyzed, Dr. Engstrom estimated
150. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 294 (M.D. La. 1988).
151. Id. (citing Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), affid,
409 U.S. 1095, 93 S. Ct. 904 (1973); Voter Information Project v. City of Baton
Rouge, 612 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also McDuff, supra note 27, at 971-
74 (discussing the one-man, one-vote principle and judicial elections).
152. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424
U.S. 636, 96 S. Ct. 1083 (1976).
153. Clark, 725 F. Supp. at 296 (citing Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of
Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. La. 1986), aftd, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987);
Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983); East Jefferson Coal. for
Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson, 691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988)).
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that black voters expressed a preference for black
candidates in 19 (one by plurality and 18 by majority).
Again, white voters never cast even a plurality for any
black candidate.
The parties have stipulated that in 13 judicial districts and
several court of appeal districts, the black population is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute
a majority in at least one single-member sub-district. 154
Furthermore, in discussing Louisiana's polarized voting
patterns and the systemic problem of Section 2 violations, the court
also observed that "[iln 49 of 54 elections black voters preferred a
black candidate; white voters never voted even a plurality for a
black candidate." 155 The court also found through stipulations that
even though "black citizens comprise about thirty percent of
Louisiana's population[,] [b]lack lawyers now hold only 5 of the
178 district court judgeships and only 1 of 48 court of appeal
judgeships. 156
In concluding that Louisiana's system of judicial elections
violated Section 2 of the Act, the court referred to certain
prominent facts:
In the twentieth century, only six black judges have been
elected to the district court or court of appeal in Orleans.
They are: Israel Augustine (Court of Appeal), Ernest
Morial (Court of Appeal), Joan Armstrong (Court of
Appeal), Revius Ortique, Jr. (Civil District Court), Bernette
Johnson (Civil District Court) and Yada McGee (Civil
District Court). When Judge Augustine was elected to the
Court of Appeal, he was a sitting criminal district judge and
he had no opposition. When Judge Morial was elected to
the Court of Appeal, he was a sitting Juvenile Court
judge-a position to which he had been appointed. Judge
Morial was the first black lawyer to be elected to the Court
of Appeal in the twentieth century and that election was in
1972. There has never been more than one black Court of
Appeal jude at any one time in the twentieth century in
Louisiana. 1
The court, therefore, reasoned that the foregoing facts
combined with the expert testimony provided at trial "illustrate the
154. Id. at 296-97 (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 299.
157. Id. at 299-300.
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difficulty which blacks have encountered in attempting to be
elected to judicial office in Louisiana."' 158
In permanently enjoining the Louisiana judicial elections at
issue, the court concluded that under the "totality of the
circumstances," Louisiana's use of multimember judicial election
districts and circuit wide election districts afforded blacks less
opportuity than others to fully participate in the political
process.1 t
Therefore notwithstanding its determination that the "one-man,
one-vote" concept does not apply to judicial elections, the court
nevertheless enjoined the judicial elections:
Neither the Constitution nor the Voting Rights Act requires
that black citizens have judicial seats reserved for their
candidates or that they be granted judicial posts in
proportion to their numbers in the general population. But,
where black citizens constitute a significant minority of the
population, they are politically cohesive and generally lose
because of racial voting patterns, Section 2 violations arise.
There are many alternatives which may be considered.
This court has no preconceived notion as to what changes
the [g]overnor and the [1]egislature ought to make. This
court is simply convinced that the present system of
electing family court, district court, and court of appeal
judges in Louisiana has produced violations of Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act and that it will continue to produce
violations unless it is changed.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction previously issued
will be made permanent and will be expanded to enjoin all
family court, district court, and court of appeal elections
until revisions in the electoral process are made. 1
60
Thus, the court had identified Louisiana's systemic problem of
vote dilution and found it a violation of Section 2 of the Act. 16
1
The stage was therefore set to find and implement a solution.
2. Phase 2: Fixing the Problem Through a Court-
Implemented Remedy
158. Id.
159. See id. at 302.
160. Id. at 302-03.
161. Because the court was able to resolve the controversy on statutory
grounds, it did not address the constitutional allegations. See id. at 294.
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In Clark v. Roemer,162 the district court considered its former
findings of fact and introduced a remedy to the vote dilution
problems. The court began by noting that after its ruling in Clark
v. Edwards,163 and before its ruling in Clark v. Roemer, 64 while
the state legislature was fashioning a plausible solution to
Louisiana's vote dilution problem, the Fifth Circuit issued
Clements I.165 This ruling had a significant impact on the litigation
and the court's remedy.
In addressing Clements I's application to the Clark litigation,
the court remarked:
[Clements 1] effectively undercuts the teaching of Chisom
because it holds that although Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, does indeed apply to judicial
elections, the use of at-large election districts in the election
of Texas trial judges does not violate Section 2. Since
Louisiana's trial judges are also elected at-large, that
holding, if it becomes final, will have a significant impact
upon the decision which this court must hand down in this
Louisiana case.
1 66
Therefore, rather than maintain its previous position that the
entire system under which Louisiana elects members of the
judiciary was systemically flawed, the court evaluated specific
judicial districts on a case-by-case basis.' 67
162. 777 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. La. 1990). At the time the initial Clark
litigation was filed, Louisiana's governor was Edwin W. Edwards. At this point
in the litigation, however, Louisiana's governor had become Charles "Buddy"
Roemer. All facts previously identified in Clark v. Edwards are the same and
applicable to Clark v. Roemer.
163. 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988).
164. 777 F. Supp. 445.
165. League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements,
902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990).
166. Clark, 777 F.2d at 449. The court also noted that because the Fifth
Circuit ordered an en banc rehearing in Clements I, the decision was effectively
vacated. As such, because of the time sensitive nature of the vacant judicial
offices in Louisiana's state judiciary, the court proceeded under Chisom as the
only Fifth Circuit authority on-point in addressing the issues involved in the
litigation. See id.
167. See id. at 453-65 (evaluating each of the judicial districts at issue to
determine if vote dilution problems were present). In Clark v. Edwards,
however, the court adopted a "systemic problem" approach and specifically
wrote "[a]lthough minority vote dilution was not proved in each of the 41
district court districts or in all of the court of appeal districts, racial polarization
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After evaluating the specific judicial districts at issue, the court
changed its previous position and found that some judicial districts
did not have systemic vote dilution problems in violation of
Section 2 of the Act. 168  Accordingly, in addressing possible
remedies for those specific districts found to have vote dilution
problems, 169 and maintaining cognizance of Louisiana's long-
standing statutor and constitutional preference of electing the
state judiciary, the court adopted the subdistricting method
which resulted in so many black lawyers being elected to the bench
in the 1990s.
171
In adopting the subdistricting method of judicial elections, the
court
conclude[d] that the subdistrict approach suggested by
plaintiffs . . . represents the only proposal which will
actually remedy the violations of Section 2 (short of
devising an entirely different system). Election subdistricts
will be drawn in those judicial districts where violations
have been found. State residence requirements shall be
in voting in all types of elections, including judicial elections, was clearly
established statewide." 725 F. Supp. 285, 302 (M.D. La. 1988).
168. Clark, 777 F. Supp. at 465.
169. In fashioning its remedy, the court specifically noted the injunction
prayed for would only be made permanent as to the "first, fourth, ninth,
fourteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twenty-fourth and fortieth judicial
districts and as to the Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge and as to
the Court of Appeal First Circuit, District 2." Id. at 469. As to the others, the
court wrote "Itihe injunction will be vacated as to all other judicial districts." Id.
170. "Federal courts should follow policies expressed in state statutory and
constitutional provisions whenever adherence to state policy would not detract
from federal constitutional requirements. This same rule of deference applies in
Section 2 cases." Id. at 465-66 (citations omitted).
171. It bears noting that the eventual remedy was significantly delayed by the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Clements H, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990). As a
result of Clements II, the district court lifted the injunction it previously
imposed. See Clark v. Roemer, 750 F. Supp. 200, 201 (M.D. La. 1990). As
previously detailed, however, Clements I was overruled by the Supreme Court
in Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 111 S. Ct.
2376 (1991). In eventually implementing its remedy and doing so with
deliberate haste, the court wrote "[b]ut for the-as it turned out-erroneous
decision of the Fifth Circuit in the LULAC [Clements 1] case, these plaintiffs
would already have their relief, because the subdistrict elections would have
been held at the regularly scheduled judicial elections in 1990." Clark, 777 F.
Supp. at 485.
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maintained in the judicial district but there shall be no
residence requirement as to any election subdistrict. All
other state election requirements shall be maintained.
72
Consequently, pursuant to the court's order, minority judicial
subdistricts were drawn to address the vote dilution problem in the
specific judicial districts where the problems were proven to have
occurred. 1
73
B. The "Chisom Seat" was Created Through Compromise
In describing the Chisom seat's creation, enabling Louisiana's
first African-American justice to be placed on the state's highest
court, 174 at least one legal commentator indicated the process took
185 years, a new state law, six years of litigation, and a federal
consent decree. 175 The Chisom seat's creation was the result of
Act 512 of Louisiana's 1992 legislative session. 176  However,
because the same Supreme Court that was the subject of Act 512
declared the statute unconstitutional, 177 a federal consent decreecreated a minority presence on Louisiana's highest court.
1. A Note on the Perschall Litigation
In an effort to reach settlement of the ongoing Chisom
litigation that was at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, State Senator Charles D. Jones introduced Senate Bill
172. Id. at 468.
173. Furthermore, in another subsequent opinion, Clark v. Roemer, 777 F.
Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991), the court adopted several stipulations by the parties
as part of implementing the remedy it created in its previous opinion.
174. In 1992, former Orleans Parish Civil District Court Judge Revius
Ortique was elected to the Chisom seat. In 1994, when Justice Ortique reached
the mandatory retirement age of 70 under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
see La. Const. art. V, § 23 (B), Bernette Joshua Johnson, then serving as the first
female chief judge of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, was
elected to Ortique's unexpired term. In 2000, upon expiration of the Chisom
seat, Justice Johnson was elected to the Supreme Court from District 7 rather
than from the temporary district of "Orleans."
175. See generally C.C. Campbell-Rock, Justice Seeks Justice: the Chisom
Seat Challenge, 12 NBA Magazine 23 (Nat'l Bar Ass'n. Jan./Feb. 1998).
176. See generally 1992 La. Acts No. 512, § 1.
177. See Perschall v. State, 96-0322 (La. 7/01/1997), 697 So. 2d 240, 259
(declaring Act 512 unconstitutional because its provisions effectively created an
eighth justice to the Louisiana Supreme Court in violation of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974's provision for seven justices under article V, § 3).
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1255 during the 1992 legislative session. 178 In its original form,
the bill was to divide the first and third districts of the Louisiana
Second Circuit Court of Appeal into two election sections, each
having a majority black population and voter registration.1 7 9 After
the bill's original reading, it was sent to a Senate Judiciary
Committee where Senator Jones and Judge Bill Roberts testified
and made several significant amendments to the original bill.1
80
The legislature's final resolution of Senator Jones' bill was signed
into law by Governor Edwin Edwards on June 22, 1992 and
became Act 512 of the 1992 legislative session.'81
Act 512, codified in Title 13 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes,182 provided the following:
A. There is hereby established an additional judgeship for
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit, to temporarily
increase the number of judges for the court of appeal for
the circuit to thirteen judges.
B. The judge provided for in Subsection A shall be elected
from the first district of the fourth circuit by the qualified
voters of that district in 1992 .... The term of office of the
judge shall commence on January 1, 1993.
C. Pursuant to Article V, Section 5(A) of the Constitution
of Louisiana, the judge provided for in Subsection A shall
be immediately assigned to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
While assigned to the supreme court, the judge shall
participate and share equally in the cases and duties of the
justices of the supreme court during the period of the
assignment ....
D. The judgeship provided for in Subsection A shall expire
automatically on the date that a justice of the supreme court
takes office after being elected in a special election called
for the office of justice of the supreme court which is held
in District 7, as provided in R.S. 13:101.1(D) or from the
date that a justice takes office after being elected in the
regular supreme court election held in the year 2000 from
District 7, whichever occurs first. 183
On August 21, 1992, all parties to the Chisom litigation, and
the federal district judge before whom the matter was pending,
178. See id. at 245.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 247.
182. See La. R.S. 13:312.4 (1995).
183. Id.
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signed a consent decree in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.18 4 "The district court's order stated that the
Consent Judgment 'memorializes' La. Acts 1992, No. 512 and
effectively closed the Chisom case."' 85 Accordingly, in Chisom v.
Edwards,'86 the Fifth Circuit wrote "[t]he consent judgment
referred to in our order . . . having been entered by the district
court, these appeals are dismissed." 187  The case was then
remanded to the district court for final settlement.
In the Perschall v. State188 litigation, an attorney and resident
of New Orleans filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton
Rouge. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Act 512
under the United States and Louisiana Constitutions and prayed the
statute be declared unconstitutional and void ab initio.1" 9 He
alleged, inter alia, the statute violated Louisiana's constitutional
provision specifically providing that the state Supreme Court shall
be comprised of a chief justice and six associate justices. 190
After a series of procedural maneuvers whereby the litigation
was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana, transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana and
eventually sent back to state court under the Pullman abstention
doctrine,"' the state supreme court exercised its supervisory
jurisdiction in February 1996 and issued a stay of all lower court
proceedings so it could adjudicate the case. 192 In doing so, the
court addressed the plaintiff's constitutional argument as follows:
It is apparent from a plain reading of [S]ection 312.4 that
the legislature was attempting to effectuate an immediate
remedy of alleged voting rights violations by providing a
majority-minority appellate court district, with concomitant
assignment of the duly elected judge to the supreme court,
to serve in the full capacity of a justice during the period
assigned. We recognize this course of action was
undertaken in good faith to effectuate a remedy least
184. Perschall, 697 So. 2d at 247.
185. Id.
186. 975 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1992).
187. Id. at 1093.
188. 697 So. 2d 240.
189. See id. at 243
190. Id. (citing La. Const. art. V, § 3).
191. See generally R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61
S. Ct. 643 (1941).
192. Perschall, 697 So. 2d at 248-49.
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injurious to the institution, at a point in time when the
voting rights jurisprudence was in transition. However,
[S]ection 312.4's implementation effectively created an
eighth position on this [Ciourt, implicating state
constitutional concerns. While meant to be temporary,
[S]ection 312.4 has administered a process that we must
find is constrained by article V, section 3's numerative
limit.
Therefore, we must hold . . . Act [512] unconstitutional
under article V, section 3, insofar as it effectively imposes
an eighth justice on the supreme court .... 193
Even though the Chisom legislation was declared
constitutionally infirm, the seat was preserved from 1992 to 2000
under a consent decree. Creation of the Chisom seat was,
therefore, the product of compromise.
V. THE CHISOM SEAT'S BENEFICIARY: A LOOK AT JUSTICE
BERNETTE JOSHUA JOHNSON'S DISTINGUISHED CAREER BEFORE
TAKING HER OATH TO SERVE AS THE FIRST BLACK FEMALE ON
LOUISIANA'S HIGHEST COURT
Ascension Parish, Louisiana native and Louisiana Supreme
Court Associate Justice Berette Joshua Johnson was born June 17,
1943 to Mr. and Mrs. Frank Joshua, Jr.194 As a young child, she
moved to New Orleans and was educated in the Orleans Parish
public schools. In 1960, she graduated class valedictorian from
Walter L. Cohen, Senior High School. 19 5  She also earned an
academic scholarship to Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia and
received her Bachelor of Arts degree in 1964.196
Appreciating the social significance of the mid-1960s and civil
rights movement, after earning her college degree, Justice Johnson
worked as a community organizer for the NAACP Legal Defense
193. Id. at 259.
194. See Guide to the Louisiana Judiciary 60 (La. Gov. Studies, Inc. 2000
ed.).
195. See id.
196. Id. Justice Johnson has also served as a member of the executive
committee of the National Alumnae Association of Spelman College. In
celebration of her commitment to humanity and service to her alma mater, in
2001, Spelman College awarded her an honorary doctorate of laws degree. See
Louisiana Supreme Court Justices, supra note 8.
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Fund. 197 By the fall of 1965, she realized that the law was a
vehicle through which she could drive change and do her part in
civil rights.' She therefore returned to her native Louisiana to
attend the law school at Louisiana State University in Baton
Rouge. 199 Justice Johnson subsequently served as a legal intern
with the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
and earned her law degree in January 1969.20
In 1994, after serving ten years as a judge of the Civil District
Court for the Parish of Orleans and as that court's first female chief
judge, Johnson announced her candidacy for the unexpired term of
Justice Revius Ortique on the Louisiana Supreme Court.20 1 Her
candidacy was tested against two sitting judges in Orleans
Parish.20Z She advanced from the primary election to the run-off
and was elected when her opponent withdrew from the race.
20 3
History was then written. On November 16, 1994, surrounded by
family, friends, and admirers, Johnson was sworn in as the first
black female justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.204
VI. LOOKING AT THE NUMBERS: CHISOM AND CLARK LEAD TO A
SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN AFRICAN-AMERICANS ELECTED TO THE
BENCH
As one legal scholar notes, "[t]he lack of racial diversity on our
nation's courts threatens both the quality and legitimacy of judicial
decision-making. 20 5 If this premise is accepted as true, the quality
and legitimacy of Louisiana's judiciary greatly increased in the
1990s. A comparative statistical analysis of the number of
African-Americans on the state bench pre-Chisom and Clark
versus post-Chisom and Clark poignantly illustrates the numerical
progress.
In 1988, six African-American jurists served in the Louisiana
judiciary. Three of them, Judges Revius Ortique, Bernette
Johnson, and Yada Magee, served on the Orleans Parish Civil
197. See Guide to the Louisiana Judiciary, supra note 194, at 60.
198. See Transcript of Induction Ceremony of the Honorable Bernette Joshua
Johnson (November 16, 1994).
199. See id.
200. See Louisiana Supreme Court Justices, supra note 8.
201. See Guide to the Louisiana Judiciary, supra note 194, at 60.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Transcript of Induction Ceremony, supra note 198.
205. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models
and Public Confidence, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 405, 405 (2000).
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District Court in New Orleans. Judge Joan Armstrong served on
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in New Orleans. Only two
jurists, Judge Freddie Pitcher in East Baton Rouge Parish and
Judge Carl Stewart in Caddo Parish (Shreveport), served outside of
New Orleans. During the entire twentieth century through 1988,
only four African-American attorneys had been elected to district
court judgeships in Louisiana outside New Orleans. None had
been elected to a court of appeal seat except in New Orleans.2°
The dramatic shift in attaining diversity and racial parity in
Louisiana's judiciary is manifested by the exponential rise in the
number of African-American jurists. The charts in Appendix A
graphically illustrate the enhanced presence of African-Americans
on the bench in 2005.
From the charts in the Appendix, one can see that fifty-four
percent of African-American judges are elected in judicial
subdistricts outside of Orleans Parish, which is a consequential
impact of Chisom and Clark.207 Orleans Parish has a majority
African-American population, but no Section 2 violation was
found.20 8 Hence, at-large elections occur.
Two of the ten African-American intermediate appellate court
judges, Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal and Joan B. Armstrong of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal, serve as the chief judge of their court by virtue of their
seniority.2°
The enormity of Chisom's and Clark's statistical impact on
Louisiana's judiciary is further heightened by a comparison of
these numbers to the number of African-American judges in
America's three largest states: California, Texas, and New
York.210
206. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 290-92 (M.D. La. 1988).
207. See generally Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. La. 1990); La.
R.S. 13:477; La. R.S. 13:312.
208. Clark, 777 F. Supp. at 461-63.
209. La. Const. art. 10, § 12.
210. American Bar Association, The Directory of Minority Judges of the
United States (3d ed. 2001); United States Census (April 2002).
California Texas New York Louisiana
Population 33,871,648 20,851,820 18,976,450 4,468,976
No.of 1611 512 536 365
Judgeships
No. of African- 78 18 50 76
American Judges
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The enhanced presence of African-American judges has had a
concomitant impact on the social, psychological, and political
milieus of their communities. The obvious increase in visibility
has inspired a search for role models among minority youth. As
one participant in a public hearing on racial fairness in the courts
articulated:
[Y]ou have to get in the communities, and white judges are
extremely guilty about this in this area .... we don't ever
see them at any black functions whatsoever. We do see
some of the black judges that [sic] comes [sic] out, and they
sit with the people, and when kids are here, they're like role
models for the kids.
2 11
Providing a positive role model, particularly for youngsters in
troubled communities, is all the more advantageous given the
unenviable fact that 77.4% of all incarcerated juveniles in
Louisiana are African-American.2 12  There is indeed an
aspirational alternative to prison.
The enlarged visibility of African-American judges adds to the
appearance of fairness in the judicial system. Like their white
counterparts, African-American jurists are compelled to maintain
ties with their communities. Louisiana elects its judges. As a
matter of political expediency, a certain degree of social and
political interaction is desirable, if not necessary. Yet, too often in
the past, the minority populace has known judges in absentia. The
effect is "that the social and professional isolation of judges and
other court personnel from persons who may not share the same
culture or ethnicity is a significant underlying problem contributin
to the perception, if not the reality, of bias in the court system.",
2 rA
Knowing that one's community desires a tangible presence
increases a judge's sense of responsibility and attachment to that
community and ensures against charges of insularity. Further,
community identification with a judge facilitates the perception of
Percentage of
African- 4.8% 3.5% 9.3% 20.8%
American Judges
211. Louisiana Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, Final
Report 56 (1996).
212. LSU School of Social Work, Office of Social Service Research and
Development (2002).
213. Louisiana Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts,
Finding No. 5, in Final Report 12 (1996).
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individual fairness and a collective systemic fairness within ourjudiciary. "Justice should not only be done, but manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done. 21 The system must not only be
fair; it must appear to the general public to be sensitive and fair if
courts are to perform in an effective and efficient manner.
The changed complexion of Louisiana's judiciary has fostered
a new confidence in the legitimacy and credibility of Louisiana's
system of justice. African-American citizens are now greater
stakeholders in our system because of their vicarious participation
through African-American representatives on the bench. That
representation has instilled much needed faith and respect for the
integrity of the judiciary. Moreover, the increased numerical
representation of African-American judges in the judiciary has
provided a forum for injecting the viewpoints of a formerly
excluded group into the legal arena. The judicial system is now
seen as a truly pluralistic society where the voices of all segments
of society are heard.
To have a properly functioning judicial system that fulfills its
mission to an orderly society, it is imperative to have an effective
administration of that system. The accomplishment of this
responsibility is due, in large part, to the formulation and
implementation of policies by committees, boards, and
commissions.
Since 1992, African-American judges have been an integral
component in administering the wheels of justice. The Judicial
Budgetary Control Board, for instance, establishes rules and
regulations governing "the expenditure of all funds appropriated by
the legislature to the judiciary." 215 The chief judge of each court of
appeal or his designee sits on this board.216 Thus, the chief judges
of the third and fourth circuit courts of appeal, both of whom are
African-American, 217 have a voice in the preparation, review, and
approval of the state judiciary's budgetary requests.
The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana is the disciplinary
body for Louisiana judges. Its judicial composition consists of one
court of appeal judge and two district court judges appointed by
the Louisiana Supreme Court.218 Its function is to investigate and
214. Rex v. Sussex, Justices, (1924) 1 L.J.K.B. 259 (Eng.).
215. Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Part G, General
Administrative Rules, § 4(b), available at http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/
PartGSection4.asp.
216. Id. § 4(a).
217. Chief Judge Joan Armstrong of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and
Chief Judge Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal.
218. La. Const. art. 5, § 25.
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make recommendations to the Supreme Court regarding judicial
misconduct. 219 Its present chairperson is Judge Benjamin Jones of
the Fourth Judicial District in Monroe. Justice Bernette Johnson of
the Louisiana Supreme Court serves on the Judicial Council. Its
responsibility is to study the organization of the courts and to
receive suggestions "relating to remedies for fault in the
administration of justice.,, 220 The Louisiana State Law Institute is
the official law reform agency of the state of Louisiana,221 which
functions "to secure the better administration of justice" and to
"encourage the clarification and simplification of the law of
Louisiana and its better adaptation to present social needs." 222 At
least three African-American judges serve as members of the
Institute.223 Finally, the governing bodies of the district and
appellate courts, the Louisiana District Judges Association and the
Conference of Court of Appeal Judges, were recently led by
African-American judges. 224
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, there
were very few African-American lawyers and absolutely no
African-American jurists in Louisiana. Consequently, many in the
state's African-American community viewed Louisiana's judicial
system in the same manner as the poet Langston Hughes:
That Justice is a blind goddess
Is a thing to which we blacks are wise,
Her bandage hides two festering sores
That once perhaps were eyes.
225
219. La. Sup. Ct. R. 23, available at http://www.lasc.orglruleslsupremel
RuleXXIII.asp.
220. La. Sup. Ct. R. 22, § 5, available at http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/
RuleXXII.asp.
221. La. R.S. 24:201 (1994).
222. La. R.S. 24:204(A) (1994).
223. Judge Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal;
Judge Luke Lavergne of the East Baton Rouge Parish Family Court; and Judge
Curtis Calloway of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (East Baton Rouge
Parish).
224. Judge Michael Bagneris of Orleans Parish Civil District Court in 2003-
2004 and Judge Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal
in 2003-2004.
225. Langston Hughes, Justice, quoted in Milton Meltzer, Langston Hughes:
A Biography 160 (1968).
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Largely because of Chisom and Clark, however, Louisiana's
judicial system is seen differently. It can now be responsive to all
sections of the community because it is comprised of jurists from
all sections of the community. African-American judges, in
collegial cooperation with their white colleagues, have-in the
words of Henry David Thoureau-carved and painted the very
atmosphere and medium through which we look to affect the
quality of the day. That medium is Louisiana's now-diverse
judiciary, where the judges' work is the very highest of the arts.
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
APPENDIX A
Chart 1
Number of African-American Judges Compared to Total Number of
Judges in Louisiana
226
Total SupremeCourt
r r
Intermediate
Appellate
Courts
District
Courts
City &
Parish
Courts
Family
&
Juvenile
Courts
No.of 365 7 53 214 73 18
Judgeships
No. ofAfrican-Amrican 76 1 10 46 12 7American
Judges
Percentage
of African- 20.8% 14.3% 18.9% 21.5% 16.4% 38.8%
American
Judges
226. Secretary of State, 2004 Louisiana Roster of Officials (2004); Office of
the Judicial Administrator, Supreme Court of Louisiana, Directory, Louisiana
Judges (2005); American Bar Association, The Directory of Minority Judges of
the United States (3d ed. 2001).
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Chart 2
Number of African-American Judges Within Orleans Parish and Outside of
Orleans Parish
227
Total SupremeCourt
Intermediate
Appellate
Courts
District
Courts
City &
Parish
Courts
Family &
Juvenile
Courts
No. ofuoh 76 1 10 46 12 7Judgeships
No. of
Judgeships 35 1 5 19 6 4
in Orleans
Parish I
No. of
Judgerships
Outside 41 0 5 27 6 3
Orleans
Parish
Percentage
of African-
American
Judges 54% 0% 50% 58.7% 50% 42.9%
Outside of
Orleans
Parish
227. Id.
494 [Vol. 66
